Henry David Thoreau, Hypocrite

Do yourself a favor today and read Kathryn Schulz take on Waldenghazi. Ayn Rand even comes up:

The other and more damning answer to the question of why we admire him is not that we read him incompletely and inaccurately but that we read him exactly right. Although Thoreau is often regarded as a kind of cross between Emerson, John Muir, and William Lloyd Garrison, the man who emerges in “Walden” is far closer in spirit to Ayn Rand: suspicious of government, fanatical about individualism, egotistical, élitist, convinced that other people lead pathetic lives yet categorically opposed to helping them. It is not despite but because of these qualities that Thoreau makes such a convenient national hero.

Well worth your while to read the whole thing.

Henry David Thoreau, Hypocrite

Scott Brown’s Favorite Justice

Perhaps an ad should be made that superimposes Scott Brown’s self-professed man-love of Justice Antonin Scalia with these comments that Scalia recently made at the the AEI:

The death penalty? Give me a break. [The framers of the Constitution didn’t think it was unconstitutional and neither do I]. It’s easy. Abortion? Absolutely easy. Nobody ever thought the Constitution prevented restrictions on abortion. Homosexual sodomy? Come on. For 200 years, it was criminal in every state [and therefore it should ever remain thus].

Good ole moderate Scott Brown. Always willin’ to work across the aisle when it comes to restricting women’s rights, restricting who we sleep with, and (most of all) promoting government sponsored execution. I’m sure these and other positions he and his beloved Justice share poll very well here in the Commonwealth. It’s a textual thing, you wouldn’t understand.

Profiles in Compromise

tl;dr: Deval Patrick should be whisked away to Washington DC as executive legislative adviser to The Democrat caucus. The man knows how to run a compromise.

Ense petit placidam sub libertate quietem

We here in the People’s Republic of MA (like innumerable other rubes around Our Republic) seem to believe that if we cast our lot into the already saturated “high end” casino market that all Our Problems will be solved, preferably overnight.
In fact, Governor Deval Patrick tried to run a plan along these very lines through the General Court (what serious people know to be the actual name of our legislative branch) pre-meltdown.
But before we get to the rest of the story, let’s just get out of the way that Lemkin firmly believes MA will, no matter how the exact terms of the legislation turn out, be left with a single, already run down on opening day “racino” (e.g. some cheap-o brand™ slot machines in a temporary out-building clumsily tacked on to an existing track for the horsey racing. Suffolk Downs, perhaps. For those of you scoring at home, we’re now two years and counting on this particular semi-crazed belief.)

First Compromise

Being a state full of legislative do-nothings who want to do nothing that might possibly rock the boat and, if possible, not even build or look at or refer to the boat lest it also be rocked by one or some of those actions, naturally did nothing about the governor’s casino proposal. It was an early and stinging defeat for the then-new and popular governor facing, uh, stern opposition from a General Court massively dominated by his own party…
But, what do you know, then-Speaker (one Salvatore DiMasi) more or less got dragged off in manacles (seemingly) as a direct result of this inaction.

Second Compromise

So the meltdown. Like many states, about 190 trillion dollars has come out of teacher pay, bridge spackle, food for babies, and most definitely libraries. Unlike many states, MA actually has a well managed rainy day fund, though any and every use of same faces seemingly daily disputes about whether or not this crisis is, in fact, a rainy day. Anywho, interest in all that “free money” from casinos is unsurprisingly revived.
Hey, I was for it before I was for it, says Governor Patrick. Let’s dust of old dusty here and run it through again: the original plan called for three casino licenses put up for competitive bids; we can now set about arguing over the wheres and hows.
New Speaker Robert DeLeo sees a golden opportunity right there in his very own district: Suffolk Downs can get slots! Perhaps even in a ramshackle “temporary” outbuilding! Lots of arguing ensues. Sooner or later, a deal emerges that lays out a surprisingly evenhanded compromise: one racino (that will be put out for bid, thus ensuring some extra revenue) plus, of course, the original three casino resort licenses (and all the aforementioned wheres and hows).
Then: Surprise! DeLeo sees to it that the legislation arrives on Patrick’s desk with provisions for two, count ‘em TWO racinos. Since there would then be no bidding (as exactly two existing tracks want to add slots), this is a direct handout that costs the Commonwealth at least some amount of money and further dilutes an already diluted gambling audience that we plan to dilute some more and then laugh all the way to the bank about. But surely the governor will wilt like a Typical Democrat, take his medicine, and get his long beloved three casinos at the seemingly small expense of two (dread) racinos.

The Reply

Now, what do you imagine happened? We all know that The Democrat is the undisputed king of still accepting a compromise even after the terms compromise itself are rescinded to the point of mockery (usually this boils down to promised GOP support that evaporates and but so the GOP-demanded provisions are left in there anyway). Well, it turns out we’ve got a version of the line item veto here. So Deval dusts off old dusty: not one but two racinos are removed from the bill. What is essentially his initial three casino plan is returned to the General Court. Take it or leave it. One can only assume the word “motherfuckers” figures in there somewheres.

DC could learn a lot from this man.

(Not) Frakked Up

This curve (Austin Frakt via Kevin Drum) gave me the heebeegeebees yesterday:

Depending on our positions on that curve, reforms could actually increase costs…and it’s unclear just where we are. Turns out, those fears were (likely) misplaced. Results from Our Beloved Commonwealth (we’ve had the Death Panels up and running for a while now…) seem to imply that, hey presto, this healthcare reform thing can actually drive down costs:

the most authoritative objective voice in this debate suggests that reform will significantly reduce, not increase, nongroup premiums.

This conclusion is consistent with evidence from Massachusetts. In their December 2007 report, AHIP reported that the average single premium at the end of 2006 for a nongroup product in the United States was $2,613. In a report issued just this week, AHIP found that the average single premium in mid-2009 was $2,985, or a 14 percent increase. That same report presents results for the nongroup markets in a set of states. One of those states is Massachusetts, which passed health-care reform similar to the one contemplated at the federal level in mid-2006. The major aspects of this reform took place in 2007, notably the introduction of large subsidies for low-income populations, a merged nongroup and small group insurance market, and a mandate on individuals to purchase health insurance. And the results have been an enormous reduction in the cost of nongroup insurance in the state: The average individual premium in the state fell from $8,537 at the end of 2006 to $5,143 in mid-2009, a 40 percent reduction, while the rest of the nation was seeing a 14 percent increase.

Imagine that. Increasing the pool size, having a mandate, and guaranteeing coverage reduces rates by spreading risk. Will wonders ever cease?